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Abstract
Theories about the evolution of consciousness relate in an intimate way to theories about 
the distribution of consciousness, which range from the view that only human beings are 
conscious to the view that all matter is in some sense conscious. Broadly speaking, such 
theories can be classified into discontinuity theories and continuity theories. Discontinuity 
theories propose that consciousness emerged only when material forms reached a given 
stage of evolution, but propose different criteria for the stage at which this occurred. Con-
tinuity theories argue that in some primal form, consciousness always accompanies matter 
and as matter evolved in form and complexity consciousness co-evolved, for example into 
the forms that we now recognise in human beings. Given our limited knowledge of the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for the presence of human consciousness in human brains, 
all options remain open. On balance however continuity theory appears to be more elegant 
than discontinuity theory.
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The distribution of consciousness
Theories	 about	 the	 evolution	of	 consciousness	 are	 linked	 to	 theories	 about	
the	distribution	of	consciousness.	Are	we	the	only	conscious	beings?	Or	are	
other	animals	and	other	living	systems	also	conscious	and,	if	so,	might	con-
sciousness	extend	to	non-living	systems	such	as	computers?	Philosophers	and	
scientists	have	expressed	many	different	views	on	these	matters.	As	the	data	
needed	to	decide	these	matters	is	not	currently	available,	all	views	are	partly	
speculative.	Why?	Because	we	do	not	even	know	the	necessary	and	sufficient	
conditions	for	consciousness	in	our	own	brains!	As	John	(1976)	pointed	out	
we	do	not	know	 the	physical	 and	chemical	 interactions	 involved,	how	big	a	
neuronal	system	must	be	to	sustain	it,	nor	even	whether	it	is	confined	to	brains.	
Over	30	years	later,	little	has	changed.	Given	this	underdetermination	by	the	
data,	opinions	about	the	distribution	of	consciousness	have	ranged	from	the	
ultra-conservative	(only	humans	are	conscious)	to	the	extravagantly	libertari-
an	(everything	that	might	possibly	be	construed	as	having	consciousness	does	
have	consciousness).
The	view	that	only	humans	have	consciousness	has	a	long	history	in	theology,	
following	 naturally	 from	 the	 doctrine	 that	 only	 human	 beings	 have	 souls.	
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Some	philosophers	and	scientists	have	elaborated	this	doctrine	into	a	philo-
sophical	position.	According	to	Descartes	only	humans	combine	res cogitans	
(the	stuff	of	consciousness)	with	res extensa	(material	stuff).	Non-human	ani-
mals,	which	he	refers	to	as	“brutes”,	are	nothing	more	than	nonconscious	ma-
chines.	Lacking	consciousness,	they	do	not	have	reason	or	language.	Eccles	
(in	Popper	&	Eccles,	1976)	adopted	a	similar,	dualist	position	–	but	argued	
that	it	is	only	through	human	language	that	one	can	communicate	sufficiently	
well	with	 another	 being	 to	 establish	whether	 it	 is	 conscious.	Without	 lan-
guage,	he	suggests,	the	only	defensible	option	is	agnosticism	or	doubt.	Jaynes	
(1990)	by	contrast,	argued	that	human	language	is	a	necessary condition	for	
consciousness.	And	Humphrey	 (1983)	adopted	a	similar	view,	arguing	 that	
consciousness	emerged	only	when	humans	developed	a	“theory	of	mind”.	He	
accepts	that	we	might	find	it	useful	for	our	own	ethical	purposes	to	treat	other	
animals	as if	they	were	conscious,	but	without	self-consciousness	of	the	kind	
provided	by	a	human	“theory	of	mind”	they	really	have	no	consciousness	at	
all!	There	are	other,	modern	variants	of	this	position	(e.g.	Carruthers,	1998)	
but	we	do	not	need	an	exhaustive	survey.	It	is	enough	to	note	that	thinkers	of	
very	different	persuasions	have	held	this	view.	Early	versions	of	this	position	
appear	to	be	largely	informed	by	theological	doctrine;	later	versions	are	based	
on	the	supposition	that	higher	mental	processes	of	the	kinds	unique	to	humans	
are	necessary	for	consciousness	of	any	kind.
In	my	book	Understanding Consciousness,	I	argue	that	this	extreme	position	
has	little	to	recommend	it	when applied to humans,	let	alone	other	animals.	
Phenomenal	consciousness	 in	humans	 is	constructed	from	different	extero-
ceptive	and	interoceptive	resources	and	is	composed	of	different	“experiential	
materials”	(what	we	see,	hear,	touch,	taste,	smell,	feel	and	so	on).	It	is	true	
that	our	higher	cognitive	 functions	also	have	manifestations	 in	experience,	
for	example,	in	the	form	of	verbal	thoughts.	Consequently,	without	language	
and	the	ability	to	reason,	such	thoughts	would	no	longer	be	a	part	of	what	we	
experience	(in	the	form	of	“inner	speech”).	But	one	can	lose	some	sensory	
and	even	mental	capacities	while	other	capacities	remain	intact	(in	cases	of	
sensory	impairment,	aphasia,	agnosia	and	so	on).	And	there	is	no	scientific	
evidence	to	support	the	view	that	language,	the	ability	to	reason	and	a	theory	
of	mind	are	necessary conditions	for	visual,	auditory	and	other	sensory	expe-
riences.	Applied	to	humans,	this	view	is	in	any	case	highly	counterintuitive.	If	
true,	we	would	have	to	believe	that,	prior	to	the	development	of	language	and	
other	higher	cognitive	functions,	babies	experience	neither	pleasure	nor	pain,	
and	that	their	cries	and	chuckles	are	just	the	nonconscious	output	of	small	bio-
logical	machines.	We	would	also	have	to	accept	that	autistic	children	without	
a	“theory	of	mind”	never	have	any	conscious	experience!	To	any	parent,	such	
views	are	absurd.
Such	views	confuse	the	necessary	conditions	for	the	existence	of	conscious-
ness	with	the	added	conditions	required	to	support	its	many	forms.	Conscious-
ness	in	humans	appears	to	be	regulated	by	global	arousal	systems,	modula-
ted	by	attentional	systems	that	decide	which	representations	(of	the	external	
world,	body	and	mind/brain	itself)	are	to	receive	focal	attention.	Neural	rep-
resentations,	arousal	systems	and	mechanisms	governing	attention	are	found	
in	many	other	animals	(Jerison,	1985).	Other	animals	have	sense	organs	that	
detect	environmental	information	and	perceptual	and	cognitive	processes	that	
analyse	and	organise	that	 information.	Many	animals	are	also	able	to	com-
municate	and	live	in	complex	emotional	and	social	worlds	(Dawkins,	1998;	
Panksepp,	2007).	Overall,	 the	precise	mix	of	sensory,	perceptual,	cognitive	
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and	 social	 processes	 found	 in	 each	 species	 is	 likely	 to	be	 species-specific.	
Given	this,	it	might	be	reasonable	to	suppose	that	only	humans	can	have	full 
human consciousness.	But	it	is	equally	reasonable	to	suppose	that	some	non-
human	animals	have	unique,	non-human	forms	of	consciousness.
Given	the	evidence	for	the	gradual	evolution	of	the	human	brain,	it	also	seems	
unlikely	 that	 consciousness	 first	 emerged	 in	 the	 universe,	 fully	 formed,	 in	
homo sapiens.	As	the	naturalist	Thomas	Huxley	observed	in	1874,
“The	doctrine	of	continuity	is	too	well	established	for	it	to	be	permissible	to	me	to	suppose	that	
any	complex	natural	phenomenon	comes	into	existence	suddenly,	and	without	being	preceded	
by	simpler	modifications;	and	very	strong	arguments	would	be	needed	to	prove	that	such	com-
plex	phenomena	as	those	of	consciousness,	first	make	their	appearance	in	man.”
Is consciousness confined to complex brains?
One	cannot	be	certain	that	other	animals	are	conscious	–	or	even	that	other	
people	are	conscious	(the	classical	problem	of	“other	minds”).	However,	the	
balance	of	evidence	strongly	supports	it	(Dawkins,	1998;	Panksepp,	2007).	In	
cases	where	other	animals	have	brain	structures	that	are	similar	to	humans,	
that	support	social	behaviour	that	is	similar	to	humans	(agression,	sexual	ac-
tivity,	pair-bonding	and	so	on),	it	is	difficult	to	believe	that	they	experience	
nothing	at	all!	But	if	one	does	not	place	the	conscious/nonconscious	boundary	
between	humans	and	non-humans,	where	should	one	place	it?
It	 might	 be	 that	 consciousness	 is	 confined	 to	 animals	 whose	 brains	 have	
achieved	some	(unknown)	critical	mass	or	critical	complexity.	The	contents	
of	human	consciousness	are	constructed	from	different	sense	modalities,	and	
within	a	given	sense	modality,	experiences	can	be	of	unlimited	variety	and	
be	exquisitely	detailed.	Where	such	conscious	states	are	complex,	the	neural	
states	that	support	them	must	have	equivalent	complexity.	However,	it	does	
not	follow	from	this	that	only	brains	of	similar	complexity	can	support	any	
experience.	Complex,	highly	differentiated	brains	are	likely	to	be	needed	to	
support	complex,	highly	differentiated	experiences.	But	 it	 remains	possible	
that	relatively	simple	brains	can	support	relatively	simple	experiences.
Given	 this,	 it	 is	 tempting	 to	 search	 for	 the	conditions	 that	distinguish	con-
scious	from	nonconscious	processing	in	our	own	brains	irrespective	of	com-
plexity	–	for	example	to	isolate	neural	changes	produced	by	simple	stimuli	
just	above	and	below	some	threshold	of	awareness	in	different	sense	modali-
ties.	This	is	a	sensible	strategy	that	is	widely	pursued	in	psychology	and	asso-
ciated	brain	sciences.	In	the	human	case,	only	representations	at	the	focus	of	
attention	reach	consciousness	and	then	only	in	a	sufficiently	aroused	state	(an	
awake	or	dreaming	state,	but	not	coma	or	deep	sleep),	so	it	would	be	useful	to	
learn	what	happens	to	such	representations	to	make	them	conscious.	Common	
suggestions	are	activation	of	neuronal	activity	above	some	critical	threshold	
(Merickle,	2007),	 the	activation	of	 specific	consciousness-bearing	circuitry	
(Crick	&	Koch,	 2007;	Rees	&	Frith,	 2007),	 “neural	 binding”	produced	by	
relatively	 coherent,	 phase-locked	 activity	 of	 some	 neural	 sub-populations	
relative	 to	 the	 uncoordinated	 activity	 of	 other	 populations	 (Singer,	 2007),	
and	a	transition	from	modular,	restricted	forms	of	information	processing	to	
widespread	information	dissemination	throughout	the	brain	(Baars,	2007;	De-
haene	&	Naccache,	2001)	.
Even	if	one	of	these	or	some	combination	of	these	conditions	for	conscious-
ness	turn	out	to	be	necessary	for	consciousness	in	the	human	mind/brain,	we	
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still	need	 to	be	cautious	about	 treating	such	conditions	as	universal.	Under	
normal	conditions,	the	human	mind/brain	receives	simultaneous	information	
from	a	 range	of	 sense	organs	 that	 simultaneously	monitor	 the	external	and	
internal	environment	and	this	information	needs	to	be	related	to	information	
in	 long-term	memory,	 and	 assessed	 for	 importance	 in	 the	 light	 of	 ongoing	
needs	and	goals.	 In	short,	 there	are	many	 things	going	on	at	once.	But	we	
cannot	give	everything	our	 full,	undivided	attention.	As	Donald	Broadbent	
pointed	out	in	1958,	there	is	a	“bottleneck”	in	human	information	processing.	
The	human	effector	system	is	also	limited	–	we	only	have	two	eyes,	hands,	
legs,	etc.,	and	effective	action	in	the	world	requires	precise	co-ordination	of	
eye-movements,	limbs	and	body	posture.	As	a	result,	the	mind/brain	needs	to	
select	the	most	important	information,	to	decide	on	best	strategy	and	to	co-
ordinate	its	activity	sufficiently	well	to	interact	with	the	world	in	a	coherent,	
integrated	way.
To	achieve	this,	it	is	as	important	to	stop	things	happening	in	the	brain	as	it	is	
to	make	them	happen.	As	William	Uttal	observed
“There	is	an	a	priori	requirement	that	some	substantial	portion,	perhaps	a	majority,	of	the	synap-
ses	that	occur	at	the	terminals	of	the	myriad	synaptic	contacts	of	the	three-dimensional…	(neu-
ral)…	lattice	must	be	inhibitory.	Otherwise	the	system	would	be	in	a	constant	state	of	universal	
excitement	after	the	very	first	input	signal,	and	no	coherent	adaptive	response	to	complex	stimu-
li	would	be	possible”	(Uttal,	1978:	192).
This	 opens	 up	 the	 possibility	 that	 selective	 attention	 doesn’t	 so	much	add	
something	special	 to	neural	 representational	states	at	 the	focus	of	attention	
to	give	them	associated	consciousness.	Consciousness	might	be	a	“natural”	
accompaniment	of	neural	representation	(see	for	example	Zeki,	2007).	If	so,	
it	may	just	be	that	for	attended	to	representational	states,	inhibitory	processes	
don’t	prevent	it.	To	prevent	information	overload,	not	to	mention	utter	confu-
sion,	information	and	awareness	of	information	outside	the	focus	of	attention	
might	be	inhibited.	Conversely,	information	that	is	integrated	into	a	represen-
tation	of	the	current,	“psychological	present”	might	be	released	from	inhibi-
tion	(Arbuthnott,	1995).
If	so,	the	mechanisms	required	to	select,	co-ordinate,	integrate	and	dissemi-
nate	conscious	information	in	the	human	brain	may	not	be	required	for	sim-
pler	creatures,	with	simpler	brains.	If	consciousness	is	a	natural	accompani-
ment	of	neurally	encoded	 information,	 such	creatures	might	have	a	 simple	
form	of	consciousness.
The	visual	system	of	the	frog,	for	example,	appears	to	be	structured	to	respond	
to	just	four	stimulus	features:	a	sustained	contrast	in	brightness	between	two	
portions	of	 the	visual	 field,	 the	presence	of	moving	edges,	 the	presence	of	
small	moving	spots	and	an	overall	dimming	of	the	visual	field.	This	is	a	far	
cry	 from	 the	 variety	 and	detail	 provided	by	 the	 human	visual	 system.	But	
there	seems	little	reason	to	jump	to	the	conclusion	that	the	frog	sees	nothing.	
Rather,	as	Lettvin,	et. al.	(1959)	proposed,	the	frog	may	see	just	four	things	
relating	to	its	survival.	A	sudden	dimming	of	the	light	or	a	moving	edge	may	
indicate	the	presence	of	a	predator	and	is	likely	to	initiate	an	escape	response.	
Sustained	differences	in	brightness	may	allow	the	frog	to	separate	water	from	
land	and	lily	pad.	And	moving	spot	detectors	may	allow	the	frog	to	see	(and	
catch)	a	moving	fly	at	tongue’s	length.
As	one	continues	to	descend	the	evolutionary	ladder,	the	plausibility	of	ex-
trapolating	 from	 human	 to	 non-human	 animal	 consciousness	 becomes	 in-
creasingly	remote.	There	may,	for	example,	be	critical	transition	points	in	the	
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development	of	consciousness	that	accompany	critical	transitions	in	function-
al	organisation	(Sloman,	1997).	Self-awareness,	for	example,	probably	occurs	
only	in	creatures	capable	of	self-representation.	That	said,	phenomenal	con-
sciousness	(of	any	kind)	might	only	require	representation.	If	so,	even	simple	
invertebrates	might	have	some	rudimentary	awareness,	in	so	far	as	they	are	
able	to	represent	and,	indeed,	respond	to	certain	features	of	the	world.
Planarians	(flat	worms)	for	example,	can	be	taught	to	avoid	a	stimulus	light	if	
it	has	been	previously	associated	with	an	electric	shock	(following	a	classical	
conditioning	procedure).	And	simple	molluscs	such	as	 the	sea-hare	Aplysia	
that	withdraw	into	their	shells	when	touched,	respond	to	stimulus	“novelty”.	
For	example,	they	may	habituate	(show	diminished	withdrawal)	after	repeated	
stimulation	at	a	given	site,	but	withdraw	fully	if	the	same	stimulation	is	ap-
plied	to	another	nearby	site.	Habituation	in	Aplysia	appears	 to	be	mediated	
by	 events	 at	 just	 one	 centrally	 placed	 synapse	 between	 sensory	 and	motor	
neurons.	This	is	very	simple	learning,	and	it	is	very	difficult	to	imagine	what	
a	mollusc	might	experience.	But	if	the	ability	to	learn	and	respond	to	the	en-
vironment	were	the	criterion	for	consciousness,	there	would	be	no	principled	
grounds	to	rule	this	out.	It	might	be,	for	example,	that	simple	approach	and	
avoidance	are	associated	with	rudimentary	experiences	of	pleasure	and	pain.
Is consciousness confined to brains?
It	is	commonly	thought	that	the	evolution	of	human	consciousness	is	intima-
tely	linked	to	the	evolution	of	the	neocortex	(e.g.	Jerison,	1985)	–	and	it	seems	
likely	that	cortical	structures	play	a	central	role	in	determining	the	forms	of	
consciousness	 that	 we	 experience.	 However,	 whether	 consciousness	 first	
emerged	with	the	emergence	of	the	neocortex	or	whether	there	is	something	
special	about	the	nature	of	cortical	cells	that	somehow	“produces”	consciou-
sness	is	less	certain.	As	Charles	Sherrington	has	pointed	out,	there	appears	to	
be	nothing	special	about	the	internal	structure	of	brain	cells	that	might	make	
them	uniquely	responsible	for	mind	or	consciousness.	For,
“A	brain-cell	is	not	unalterably	from	birth	a	brain-cell.	In	the	embryo-frog	the	cells	destined	to	
be	brain	can	be	replaced	by	cells	from	the	skin	of	the	back,	the	back	even	of	another	embryo;	
these	after	transplantation	become	in	their	new	host	brain-cells	and	seem	to	serve	the	brain’s	
purpose	duly.	But	cells	of	the	skin	it	is	difficult	to	suppose	as	having	a	special	germ	of	mind.	
Moreover	cells,	like	those	of	the	brain	in	microscopic	appearance,	in	chemical	character,	and	in	
provenance,	are	elsewhere	concerned	with	acts	wholly	devoid	of	mind,	e.g.	the	knee-jerk,	the	
light-reflex	of	the	pupil.	A	knee-jerk	‘kick’	and	a	mathematical	problem	employ	similar-look-
ing	cells.	With	the	spine	broken	and	the	spinal	cords	so	torn	across	as	to	disconnect	the	body	
below	from	the	brain	above,	although	the	former	retains	the	unharmed	remainder	of	the	spinal	
cord	consisting	of	masses	of	nervous	cells,	and	retains	a	number	of	nervous	reactions,	it	reveals	
no	trace	of	recognizable	mind….	Mind,	as	attaching	to	any	unicellular	life	would	seem	to	be	
unrecognizable	to	observation;	but	I	would	not	feel	that	permits	me	to	affirm	that	it	is	not	there.	
Indeed,	I	would	think,	that	since	mind	appears	in	the	developing	source	that	amounts	to	show-
ing	that	it	is	potential	in	the	ovum	(and	sperm)	from	which	the	source	spring.	The	appearance	
of	recognizable	mind	in	the	source	would	then	be	not	a	creation	de novo	but	a	development	of	
mind	from	unrecognizable	into	recognizable.”	(Sherrington,	1942)
Indeed,	given	our	current,	limited	knowledge	of	the	necessary	and	sufficient	
conditions	for	consciousness	in	humans,	we	cannot,	as	yet,	rule	out	even	more	
remote	possibilities.	If	the	ability	to	represent	and	respond	to	the	world,	or	the	
ability	to	modify	behaviour	consequent	on	interactions	with	the	world	are	the	
criteria	for	consciousness,	then	it	may	be	that	consciousness	extends	not	just	
to	simple	invertebrates	(such	as	Planaria)	but	also	to	unicellular	organisms,	
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fungi	and	plants.	For	example,	the	leaflets	of	the	Mimosa	plant	habituate	to	
repeated	 stimulation,	 i.e.	 the	 leaflets	 rapidly	 close	when	 first	 touched,	 but	
after	repeated	stimulation	they	re-open	fully	and	do	not	close	again	while	the	
stimulus	remains	the	same.	Surprisingly,	this	habituation	is	stimulus-specific.	
For	example,	Holmes	&	Yost	(1966)	induced	leaflet	closure	using	either	water	
droplets	or	brush	strokes,	and	after	repeated	stimulation	(with	either	stimulus)	
habituation	occurred.	But,	if	the	stimulus	was	changed	(from	water	drops	to	
brush	strokes	or	vice-versa)	leaflet	closure	re-occurred.
For	many	who	have	thought	about	this	matter,	the	transition	from	rudimentary	
consciousness	 in	animal	 life	 to	sentience	 in	plants	 is	one	 transition	 too	far.	
Perhaps	it	is.	It	is	important	to	note	however	that	a	criterion	of	consciousness	
based	on	the	ability	to	respond	to	the	world	does	not	prevent	it.	Nor,	on	this	
criterion,	can	we	rule	out	the	possibility	of	consciousness	in	systems	made	of	
materials	other	than	the	carbon-based	compounds	that	(on	this	planet)	form	
the	basis	for	organic	life.	Silicon-based	computers	can	in	principle	carry	out	
many	functions	that,	in	humans,	we	take	to	be	evidence	of	conscious	minds.	
So	how	can	we	be	certain	that	they	are	not	conscious?
One	should	recognise	too,	that	even	a	criterion	for	the	existence	of	conscious-
ness	based	on	 the	ability	 to	 respond	or	 adapt	 to	 the	world	 is	 entirely	arbi-
trary.	 It	might	 for	 example	be	 like	 something	 to	be	 something	 irrespective	
of	whether	one	does	anything!	Panpsychists	such	as	Whitehead	(1929)	have	
suggested	that	there	is	no	arbitrary	line	in	the	descent	from	macroscopic	to	
microscopic	matter	at	which	consciousness	suddenly	appears	out	of	nothing.	
Rather,	elementary	forms	of	matter	may	be	associated	with	elementary	forms	
of	experience.	And	if	they	encode	information	they	may	be	associated	with	
rudimentary	forms	of	mind.
Does matter matter?
Many	would	regard	Whitehead’s	views	as	extreme	(I	give	my	own	assessment	
below).	But	there	is	one	position	that	is	even	more	extreme	–	the	view	that	the	
nature	of	matter	doesn’t	matter	to	consciousness	at	all.	At	first	glance,	it	might	
seem	preposterous	to	claim	that	matter	doesn’t	matter	for	consciousness.	But,	
surprising	as	it	might	seem,	it	is	a	logical	consequence	of	computational func-
tionalism –	one	of	the	most	widely	adopted,	current	theories	of	mind.	As	John	
Searle	has	noted,	it	is	important	to	distinguish	this	position	from	the	view	that	
silicon robots	might	be	conscious.	For	him,	human	consciousness	in	spite	of	
its	subjectivity,	intentionality,	and	qualia	is	an	emergent	physical property	of	
the	brain.	If	so,	a	silicon	robot	might	have	consciousness.	But	this	would	de-
pend	not	on	its	programming,	but	on	whether	silicon	just	happens	to	have	the	
same	causal	powers	(to	produce	consciousness)	as	the	carbon-based	material	
of	brains.
Computational	 functionalists	 such	 as	 Daniel	 Dennett	 take	 the	 further	 step	
that,	apart	from	providing	housing	for	functioning,	material	stuff	is	irrelevant.	
Any	system	that	functions	as-if	it	has	consciousness	and	mind	does	have	con-
sciousness	and	mind.	If	a	non-biological	system	functions	exactly	like	a	hu-
man	mind	then	it	has	a	human	mind,	as	the	only	thing	that	makes	a	system	a	
“mind”	is	the	way	that	it	functions.	In	its	usual	reductionist	versions,	compu-
tational	functionalism	finesses	questions	about	the	distribution	of	first-person	
consciousness,	routinely	translating	these	into	questions	about	how	different	
systems	function	(see	Understanding Consciousness:	chapters	4	and	5).
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
44	(2/2007)	pp.	(273–282)
M.	 Velmans,	 The	 Co-Evolution	 of	Matter	
and	Consciousness279
Can one draw a line between things 
that have consciousness and those that don’t?
Where	then	should	one	draw	the	line	between	entities	that	are	conscious	and	
those	 that	 are	not?	Theories	 about	 the	distribution	of	 consciousness	divide	
into	continuity	and	discontinuity	theories.	Discontinuity	theories	all	claim	that	
consciousness	emerged	at	a	particular	point	in	the	evolution	of	the	universe.	
They	merely	disagree	about	which	point.	Consequently,	discontinuity	theories	
all	face	the	same	problem.	What	switched	the	lights	on?	What	is	it	about	mat-
ter,	at	a	particular	stage	of	evolution,	which	suddenly	gave	it	consciousness?	
As	noted	above,	most	try	to	define	the	point	of	transition	in	functional	terms,	
although	they	disagree	about	the	nature	of	the	critical	function.	Some	think	
consciousness	“switched	on”	only	in	humans,	for	example	once	they	acquired	
language	or	a	theory	of	mind.	Some	believe	that	consciousness	emerged	once	
brains	reached	a	critical	size	or	complexity.	Others	believe	it	co-emerged	with	
the	ability	to	learn,	or	to	respond	in	an	adaptive	way	to	the	environment.
In	my	view,	 such	 theories	confuse	 the	conditions	 for	 the	existence	 of	 con-
sciousness	with	the	conditions	that	determine	the	many	forms	that	it	can	take.	
Who	can	doubt	that	verbal	thoughts	require	language,	or	that	full	human	self-
consciousness	requires	a	theory	of	mind?	Without	internal	representations	of	
the	world,	how	could	consciousness	be	of	anything?	And	without	motility	and	
the	ability	 to	approach	or	avoid,	what	point	would	 there	be	 to	rudimentary	
pleasure	or	pain?	However,	none	of	these	theories	explains	what	it	is	about	
such	biological	functions	that	suddenly	switches	consciousness	on.
Continuity	theorists	do	not	face	this	problem	for	the	simple	reason	that	they	
do	not	believe	 that	consciousness	suddenly	emerged	at	any	 stage	of	evolu-
tion.	Rather,	as	Sherrington	suggests	above,	consciousness	is	a	“development	
of	mind	from	unrecognizable	into	recognizable”.	On	this	panpsychist	view,	
all	 forms	of	matter	 have	 an	 associated	 form	of	 consciousness,	 although	 in	
complex	life	forms	such	as	ourselves,	much	of	this	consciousness	is	inhibited.	
In	 the	 cosmic	 explosion	 that	 gave	birth	 to	 the	 universe,	 consciousness	 co-
emerged	with	matter	and	co-evolves	with	it.	As	matter	became	more	differen-
tiated	and	developed	in	complexity,	consciousness	became	correspondingly	
differentiated	and	complex.	The	emergence	of	carbon-based	life	forms	deve-
loped	into	creatures	with	sensory	systems	that	had	associated	sensory	“qualia”.	
The	development	of	representation	was	accompanied	by	the	development	of	
consciousness	 that	 is	of	something.	The	development	of	self-representation	
was	accompanied	by	the	dawn	of	differentiated	self-consciousness	and	so	on.	
On	this	view,	evolution	accounts	for	 the	different	 forms	 that	consciousness	
takes	 –	 and,	 in	 this	 respect,	 continuity	 theory	does	 not	 differ,	 in	 principle,	
from	discontinuity	theory.	However,	consciousness,	in	some	primal	form,	did	
not	emerge	at	any	particular	stage	of	evolution.	Rather,	it	was	there	from	the	
beginning.	Its	emergence,	with	the	birth	of	the	universe,	is	neither	more	nor	
less	mysterious	than	the	emergence	of	matter,	energy,	space	and	time.
Most	discontinuity	theorists	take	it	for	granted	that	consciousness	could	only	
have	appeared	(out	of	nothing)	through	some	random	mutation	in	complex	
life	forms	that	happened	to	confer	a	reproductive	advantage	(inclusive	survival	
fitness)	that	can	be	specified	in	third-person	functional	terms.	This	deeply	in-
grained,	pre-theoretical	assumption	has	set	the	agenda	for	what	discontinuity	
theorists	believe	they	need	to	explain.	Within	cognitive	psychology,	for	ex-
ample,	consciousness	has	been	thought	by	one	or	another	theorist	to	be	nece-
ssary	for	every	major	phase	of	human	information	processing,	for	example	in	
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the	analysis	of	complex	or	novel	input,	learning,	memory,	problem	solving,	
planning,	creativity,	and	the	control	and	monitoring	of	complex,	adaptive	re-
sponse.	I	have	presented	extensive	analyses	of	the	role	of	consciousness	in	
human	information	processing	that	cast	doubt	on	all	these	suggestions	(Vel-
mans,	1991a,b,	1993,	1996,	2000,	2002a,b,	2003).
It	should	be	apparent	 that	continuity	 theory	shifts	 this	agenda.	The	persist-
ence	of	different,	emergent	biological	forms	may	be	governed	by	reproduc-
tive	 advantage.	 If	 each	 of	 these	 biological	 forms	 has	 a	 unique,	 associated	
consciousness,	then	matter	and	consciousness	co-evolve.	However,	conven-
tional	evolutionary	theory	does	not	claim	that	matter itself	came	into	being,	
or	persists	through	random	mutation	and	reproductive	advantage.	According	
to	continuity	theory,	neither	does	consciousness.	
Which	view	is	correct?	One	must	choose	for	oneself.	In	the	absence	of	anything	
other	than	arbitrary	criteria	for	when	consciousness	suddenly	emerged,	I	confess	
that	I	find	continuity	theory	to	be	the	more	elegant.	There	may	be	critical	tran-
sition	points	in	the	forms	of	consciousness	associated	with	the	development	
of	life,	representation,	self-representation,	and	so	on.	However,	continuity	in	
the	evolution	of	consciousness	favours	continuity	in	the	distribution	of	con-
sciousness.
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Max Velmans
Die Koevolution von Materie und Bewusstsein
Zusammenfassung
Theorien über die Bewusstseinsevolution stehen in engem Zusammenhang mit Theorien über 
die Präsenz von Bewusstsein. Entsprechende Auffassungen bewegen sich zwischen dem Stand-
punkt, dass nur menschliche Wesen ein Bewusstsein haben, und der These, dass jegliche Mate-
rie in gewisser Weise über ein Bewusstsein verfügt. Allgemein formuliert, können diese Theorien 
in Diskontinuitäts- und Kontinuitätstheorien eingeteilt werden. Gemäß den Diskontinuitätsthe-
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orien ist das Bewusstsein erst dann in Erscheinung getreten, nachdem die Formen der Mate-
rie den gegebenen Evolutionsstand erreicht hatten, doch werden verschiedene Kriterien zur 
Bestimmung ebendieses Evolutionsstandes vorgeschlagen. Die Kontinuitätstheorien vertreten 
die Ansicht, dass im Falle primärer Lebensformen die Materie stets von Bewusstsein begleitet 
sei; mit der Weiterentwicklung von Form und Komplexität der Materie habe jedoch auch das 
Bewusstsein einen Koevolutionsprozess durchlaufen und so beispielsweise Formen erlangt, die 
wir heute in menschlichen Wesen erkennen. In Anbetracht unseres beschränkten Wissens über 
die erforderlichen Voraussetzungen für das Vorhandensein von Bewusstsein im Gehirn des Men-
schen bleiben alle Möglichkeiten offen. Alles in allem jedoch zeichnet sich die Kontinuitätsthe-
orie durch größere Eleganz als die Diskontinuitätstheorie aus.
Schlüsselbegriffe
Bewusstsein,	Evolution,	Koevolution,	Materie,	Kontinuität,	Diskontinuität,	Komplexität,	Gehirn
Max Velmans
La co-évolution de la matière et de la conscience
Résumé
Les théories de l’évolution de la conscience sont étroitement liées aux théories de la distribution 
de la conscience qui vont des approches considérant que seulement l’homme a une conscience 
jusqu’aux approches considérant que toute matière possède une conscience en quelque sorte. 
De manière générale, on peut distinguer les théories de la discontinuité des théories de la 
continuité. Les théories de la discontinuité considèrent que la conscience est apparue seulement 
une fois que les formes matérielles ont atteint un certain degré d’évolution mais proposent des 
critères différents lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer le degré en question. Les théories de la conti-
nuité soutiennent que, dans une certaine forme primaire, la conscience accompagne toujours la 
matière et tandis que celle-ci a évolué vers la forme, la complexité de la conscience a co-évolué 
avec elle, vers par exemple des formes que nous reconnaissons actuellement chez les êtres 
humains. Etant donnée notre connaissance limitée des conditions suffisantes et nécessaires à 
la présence de la conscience chez les êtres humains, toutes les options restent ouvertes. Tout 
compte fait, la théorie de la continuité paraît plus élégante que la théorie de la discontinuité.
Mots-clés 
conscience,	évolution,	co-évolution,	matière,	continuité,	discontinuité,	complexité,	cerveau
